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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PAUL H. SANDERS*
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has been faced with few major
Constitutional Law problems during the period under consideration.'
Statistically, the action of the Court in invalidating one law out of al-
most a score that were attacked before it on the basis of constitutional
defect suggests an attitude of judicial restraint toward the product of
a coordinate branch of government. The relatively small number of
constitutional questions raised- and many of them were obviously
make-weight rather than points of principal reliance- suggests a
general awareness of the Court's stability and the unlikelihood of its
departing from established precedent. Similarly, regard for the prece-
dent established in Plessy v. Ferguson,2 with its "separate but equal"
doctrine, was a major factor in the decision of two federal district
courts in Tennessee involving alleged deprivation of constitutional
rights in the furnishing of educational and recreational facilities to
Negroes. It was not a year for the expansion or contraction of doc-
trines of constitutionality previously established, although in one in-
stance at least it appears that some "new law" was made.
I. PowER TO TAX
A. Implied Governmental Immunity
With activities by or on behalf of the Federal Government as wide-
spread as they are and with state and local taxing authorities normally
not lacking in diligence in searching out sources of revenue, collision
between the two forces represented is inevitably frequent. How to
resolve the conflict, when Congress has not been specific, continues
to present a most difficult problem in Constitutional Law, though,
paradoxically, no specific provision of the Constitution of the United
States applies to the situation. During the Survey period, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the
State had power to tax a company which had contracted during World
War II with the Federal Government to store in privately owned tanks
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. Constitutional Law questions principally concerned with an independent
field of law are left for discussion in the pertinent articles of this Survey.
Problems arising under the Tennessee Constitution which are largely peculiar
to organization and powers of counties and municipalities are discussed in
the Local Government Law article. Similarly, those relating to form and pro-
cedure in statutory enactment are discussed in the Statutory Interpretation
article. Constitutional questions in Criminal Procedure and Evidence are dis-
cussed in the Criminal Law and Procedure article and the Procedure and
Evidence article.
2. 163 U.S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
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government-owned aviation gasoline destined for military use. The
decision that the contractor in Esso Standard Oil v. Evans3 was liable
for the state tax upon the privilege of storing and delivering such
gasoline was affirmed on May 4, 1953, by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
4
As recently as 1936, the Supreme Court of the United States in-
validated an Alabama tax when applied to the "storing or withdrawing
from storage" of gasoline withdrawn for sale to the United States
for use by the Army and the Tennessee Valley Authority.5 While
finding that storing alone was not covered, the majority opinion in
that case declared that, if it were assumed that Alabama meant to tax
"mere storing," that purpose could not be given effect in respect of
the company's sales and deliveries to the United States. It was rea-
soned that such a tax would, in practical effect, be one on a sale to the
United States. Under the doctrine of reciprocal sovereign tax im-
munity then prevailing, it was presumably very clear that such a tax
was invalid,6 as would be a federal tax on a sale to a state or one of
its subdivisions.
7
Insofar as it prevented a state tax from affecting in this manner a
federal instrumentality, the doctrine applied in the 1936 decision
traces its lineage to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland: 8
".. . the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the gen-
eral government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that
supremacy which the constitution has declared."
The great Chief Justice in another context stated that he had never
heard an affirmative answer given to such questions as: "Can a con-
tractor for supplying a military post with provisions, be restrained...
from transporting the provisions to the place at which the troops were
stationed. [O]r could he be... taxed for doing so?''
3. 250 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1952).
4. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 245 U.S. 495, 73 Sup. Ct. 800, 97 L. Ed.
741 (1953).
5. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393, 56 Sup. Ct. 818, 80 L. Ed. 1236 (1936).
6. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed.
857 (1928). Justice McReynolds observed in dissent: "I am unable to think
that every man who sells a gallon of gasoline to be used by the United States
thereby becomes a Federal instrumentality. . . ." 277 U.S. at 225.
7. Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601,
75 L. Ed. 1277 (1931).
8. 4 Wheat. 316, 436, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U.S. 1819). Marshall was of the opinion
that the decision in the case did not preclude a nondiscriminatory state tax on
the real property of the United States Bank or the application of a nondiscrimi-
natory personal property tax to the interests held by Maryland citizens in
the Bank.
9. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 867, 6 L. Ed. 204 (U.S.
1824).
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The supremacy clause' ° not containing a specific prohibition, the
immunity of the federal instrumentality from the state tax is .thus
based on implication - an implication that has been undergirded, how-
ever, by the logic deemed to emanate from the classic phrase: "[T]he
power to tax involves the power to destroy .. ."1 Although a basis
was laid for a contrary development in Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion, the implied immunity doctrine was subsequently made ap-
plicable, in certain respects at least, to federal taxation of state instru-
mentalities. 12 The principle proved to be an expanding one, particu-
larly during the 1920s, and was even applied in such a manner as to
provide in numerous instances what were widely regarded as tax
refuges for persons having dealings with the federal and state govern-
ments.13 While there were continued expressions of judicial doubt
prior to 1937 concerning some of the applications of the doctrine, these
did not extend to the pronouncement in the leading case of Van
Brocklin v. Tennessee14 that a state lacked power to lay or collect a tax
upon property owned by the federal government in the absence of
Congressional consent, regardless of the manner or purpose of the
acquisition of the property.
Beginning in 1937, the collapse of many aspects of the implied inter-
governmental tax immunity doctrine seemed to take on the charac-
teristics of an avalanche. 5 To the extent that this collapse resulted
in an increased economic burden upon the Federal Government, it
came about initially by deliberate invitation of counsel representing
the United States. The United States in 1936 had filed a brief, amicus.
curiae, in Graves v. Texas Company,16 urging the invalidity of the
Alabama tax on the storage and withdrawal of gasoline when the
10. U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U.S. 1819).
12. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (U.S. 1871). But cf. South
Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110, 50 L. Ed. 361 (1905).
13. ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 74-82 (1939); cf. ROTTSCHAEFER,
THE CONSTITUTION AND Socio-EcoNomc CHANGE 135 (1948); Powell, The Wan-
ing of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 633, 633-35 (1945).
14. 117 U.S. 151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670, 29 L. Ed. 845 (1886). The opinion demon-
strates that the granting of such immunity normally was made a condition of
admission of a state to the Union and collects the statutory references to such
immunity in all the states. This case reversed the decision of the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Anderson v. Van Brocklin, 83 Tenn. 33 (1885), which had
held that the exemptions then provided for property of the United States in
the Tennessee statutes did not extend to property bought by the United,States
at its own tax sale and held merely to secure the tax. Cf. Shelby County v.
McCanless, 163 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1942).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 1085(1) (Williams 1934) exempts from taxation all
property of the United States "used exclusively for public.., purposes."
15. See ROTTSCHAEFER, THE CONSTiITUTION AND SocIO-ECONO'AIC CHANGE 136-
40 (1948); Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58
HARV. L. REV. 633, 633-74 (1945); Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental
Tax Immunities, 58 HARv. L. REv. 757 (1945); 4 VAND. L. REV. 195 (1950).
16. 298 U.S. 393, 56 Sup. Ct. 818, 80 L. Ed. 1236 (1936). Solicitor-General
Stanley Reed and Assistant Attorney-General Robert H. Jqckson were on the
brief with other Government counsel. ."
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amount of the tax would be passed on to the United States as a con-
sumer. In 1937, in James v. Dravo Contracting Company,1 Solicitor-
General Reed, filing a brief and engaging in oral argument for the
United States as amicus curiae, supported the position of the state that
a West Virginia privilege tax was valid though laid upon the gross re-
ceipts of an independent contractor engaged in furnishing goods and
services to the United States. According to the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Roberts, the Solicitor-General proposed that any state tax
upon the operations of the United States or the means chosen for the
execution of its powers should be valid unless the taxing statute dis-
criminated against the Federal Government. A question as to the bur-
den upon federal operations brought the response that "'a tax upon
the contractor, the sole result of which is to increase the cost to the
sovereign by the amount of the normal tax burden, presents no inter-
ference with its operations.' "18 The Court upheld the state tax in a
five-to-four decision. Although the extent to which the majority
adopted the broad policy approach attributed to the Solicitor-General
is not clear, Chief Justice Hughes' opinion expressly stated that an
assumption of increased costs to the Federal Government by reason
of the state gross receipts tax would not thereby render it un-
constitutional.19
The implications of this latter remark became clearer in the Court's
1941 decision in Alabama v. King and Boozer.20 In the interim since
the Dravo decision, the Court had overruled those precedents which
had extended income tax immunity to a federal employee as against
a state and to a state employee as against the United States.21 While
these contractions in the implied immunity doctrine had also been at
the request of federal attorneys, Government counsel took the opposite
side when Alabama sought to impose its regular sales tax upon the
vendor of the materials bought by a contractor engaged in building
an Army camp on a cost-plus basis. Under the Alabama law, the tax
was collectible from the seller, but it was required to be collected by
him from the buyer. Without dissent, the Court upheld the validity
of the tax. The Court construed the facts to be that the sales of lumber
were made to the contractor rather than to the United States, although
apparently title passed to the Federal Government when the lumber
17. 302 U.S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155 (1937).
18. 302 U.S. at 171. It had already been held that a contractor was not im-
mune from a state tax on gasoline used in the performance of his contract
with the Federal Government. Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291
U.S. 466, 54 Sup. Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed. 918 (1934).
19. 302 U.S. at 160.
20. 314 U.S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3 (1941).
21. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83
L. Ed. 927 (1939), overruling Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (U.S.
1871), and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269,
81 L. Ed. 306 (1937); see also Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 58 Sup. Ct.
969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 (1938).
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was delivered. The fact that the contractor was bound to furnish the
material to the United States and was to be reimbursed by the Govern-
ment for its cost, "including the tax," was considered no more to re-
sult in an infringement of the Federal Government's immunity than
did the gross receipts tax in the Dravo case.
"So far as such a non-discriminatory state tax upon the contractor, enters
into the cost of the materials to the Government, that is but a normal
incident of the organization within the same territory of two independent
taxing sovereignties. The asserted right of the one to be free of taxation
by the other does not spell immunity from paying the added costs,-at-
tributable to the taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Government
and who have been granted no tax immunity. So far as a different view
has prevailed, see Panhandle Oil Co. v. [Mississippi] .. .Graves v. Texas
Co.... we think it no longer tenable [citing cases] ."22
In the companion case of Curry v. United States,23 the application of
the Alabama use tax to materials brought by the cost-plus contractor
from without the state also was sustained as valid.
The direct incidence of the state tax in the King and Boozer case did
not fall upon the Federal Government or upon property owned by it
at the time. The specific repudiation of Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississ-
ippi2 4 indicated that the Court would sustain a state sales tax upon
sales directly to the United States as purchaser, although the facts as
construed by the Court called for no decision on the point. It may be
important to note that the Court has not yet had occasion to decide
this specific issue.2 When Florida attempted to impose an inspection
fee on fertilizer owned and held by the Federal Government in that
state, the Court in 1943 affirmed unanimously an injunction prohibiting
both the inspection and the fees. 26 Mr. Justice Reed wrote the opinion,
noting that the fees were laid directly upon the United States and
that, if the money exactions in question were enforceable, they would
be required before executing a function of government. In 1944, a
case arose in which Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, sought to assess
a real property tax on a mill of the Mesta Machine Company, includ-
ing, pursuant to regular state law, the value of machinery in the mill
owned by the United States and leased to Mesta. Under its contract,
the Federal Government was obliged to reimburse the company for
such a state tax, and it was argued that, since the direct impact of the
tax was on Mesta, Dravo and King and Boozer indicated that the
assessment was constitutional. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote the majority
22. 314 U.S. at 8.
23. 314 U.S. 14, 62 Sup. Ct. 48, 86 L. Ed. 9 (1941).
24. 277 U.S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed. 857 (1928).
25. See Note, 96 L. Ed. 263, 272 (1952); 26 MINN. L. REv. 408, 411 (1942).




opinion declaring the tax invalid:2 7 "We think, however, that the
Government's property interests are not taxable either to it or to its
bailee."28 Separate dissenting opinions were written by Mr. Justice
Roberts and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who considered the situation in-
distinguishable from the Court's more recent decisions sustaining state
taxes on a contractor.
When faced with the Esso Standard Oil case in 1952, the Tennessee
Supreme Court had to decide whether the tax was of the type held
valid in Dravo and King and Boozer or was essentially a tax on the
United States or its property and therefore invalid under the Alle-
gheny County decision. During World War II, the United States pur-
.chased all aviation gasoline before it left the refinery, title being
vested in a corporation wholly owned by the Federal Government and
specifically exempt from state storage and use taxes. Release from
storage by the producing companies occurred only in accordance with
official allocation of specific lots of fuel to the armed services and allies
of the United States. From 1943 to 1946 certain lots of Air Force fuel
came by barge from Louisiana for shipment through Memphis, Ten-
nessee. Government storage facilities not being available, the United
States contracted with the Esso Standard Oil Company to provide such
facilities through the use of privately owned tanks, together with per-
sonnel to perform the necessary storage and handling functions. Esso
was obliged to "render services... in receiving, storing, handling and
loading Government-owned fuel" for service charges ranging from
18/100 of a cent to 6 and 3/10 cents per gallon. The United States agreed
to assume liability for all state taxes. Pursuant to this contract, the
,gasoline arriving by barge was pumped by Esso employees into the
storage tanks and later reshipped by truck to consuming airfields in
.Tennessee, Mississippi and Arkansas.
In August, 1949, the State of Tennessee demanded that Esso pay the
regular six cents per gallon tax on the gasoline stored in connection
with these operations. The Code sections 29 claimed to be applicable
provide in part as follows:
"Every distributor.., shall pay.., a special privilege tax, in addition to
all other taxes, for engaging in and carrying on such business in this state,
in an amount equal to six cents for each gallon of gasoline . . .shipped,
transported or imported by such distributor into, and distributed, stored
or sold by him within this state .... 30
".... The term 'distributor' . . . includes ... every person who engages in
the business in this state of... importing.., gasoline.., into this state,
27. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 64 Sup. Ct. 908, 88
L. Ed. 1209 (1944).
28. 322 U.S. at 187.
29. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 1126-1147 (Williams 1934, Supp. 1952).
30. Id. § 1127.
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and distributing, storing... the same in this state, for any purpose what-
soever."31
Esso paid under protest the taxes demanded for January, 1944, and
filed its bill against the State Commissioner of Finance and Taxation
in the Chancery Court of Davidson County to recover. The United
States intervened, asserting immunity in Esso. The chancellor found
that Esso was not liable for an inspection fee under Section 6821 of
the Code,32 or for interest and penalties, but that it was liable for the
privilege tax under the Code sections quoted above.33 The Tennessee
Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's decree in all respects. 34 In
determining that the Tennessee statute applied to the situation, Judge
Gailor's opinion first quoted from previous decisions to demonstrate
that the tax was for the privilege of engaging in the business of storing
gasoline. Further, "importing" was not deemed a necessary condition
precedent to the tax, although it was considered to have occurred in
any event when Esso removed the gasoline from the channels of inter-
state commerce. Tennessee Oil Co. v. McCanless,35 where the Obion
County Board of Education rented a storage tank from an oil company
and paid it for distributing gasoline at the board's order, was dis-
tinguished as involving agency rather than the services of an inde-
pendent contractor. Although some of the gasoline went to airfields
in other states, Esso's failure to report and keep identifying records in
this respect prevented it from being able to invoke statutory provisions
applicable to "exports. ' 36 Finally, the tax liability was not eliminated
by delay of state officials in demanding payment.
Having established that the Tennessee tax statute applied, Judge
Gailor turned to the immunity claimed by the United States and found
it nonexistent. It was noted that the incidence of the tax was on Esso,
not the United States.37 The Allegheny County case was not con-
sidered in point, since it was assumed to involve "an ad valorem tax
on personal property of the United States." Dravo and King and
Boozer were deemed to have settled Esso's liability for the privilege
31. Id. § 1126.
32. Id. § 6821.
33. This resulted in net tax liability in Esso of approximately $200,000 for
the month of January, 1944. The case was treated, however, as a test case for
other periods involving a total tax liability in the neighborhood of $4,000,000.
34. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 250 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1952).
35. 178 Tenn. 683, 157 S.W.2d 267, 162 S.W.2d 1081 (1941).
36. That the application of Tennessee's tax on "storage" to gasoline brought
from without the State and later used, to some extent, without the State is
not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce was established in
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed.
730 (1933). On the "interstate commerce" phase of the tax, see also TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 1127, 1140, 1148.3 (Williams 1934).
37. The pronouncement, added in 1947, TENN. CODE ANN. § 1126.1 (Williams
Supp. 1952), to the effect that "[t]he liability for, or the incidence of, the
gasoline tax is hereby declared to be a levy on the consumer" is not mentioned.
Technically, it had no application at the time.
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tax for doing business in the State, "though that business was done
entirely with property of the United States." Tennessee could not tax
the gasoline stored in the tanks or the storage if the United States had
acquired its own tanks, said the Court; but the privilege taxed here
fell in neither category, and the fact that the burden of the tax was
passed on to the Federal Government was immaterial.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Reed, used substantially the same reasoning in affirming the
implied immunity aspects of the foregoing decision.30 In Allegheny
County, the tax held invalid was based, in part, on the worth of fed-
eral property. The Tennessee privilege tax bore no such relationship
to the stored gasoline, hence was not "on" such property. Again it
was observed that there is nothing wrong with burdening the United
States financially by a state tax. Mr. Justice Reed agreed with the dis-
tinction between the situation in the instant case and that in Ten-
nessee Oil Co. v. McCanless. "Had the United States similarly rented
the tanks from Esso, and thus stood firmly in its shoes as the organiza-
tion exercising the privilege of storage, it would have fallen within
the McCanless precedent."39 The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter did not participate.
It is submitted that the decisions in this case have made new law on
implied immunity of the federal instrumentality from state taxation,
rather than falling clearly within the scope of the Dravo and King and
Boozer holdings. In neither of those cases did the state tax bear such
a close relationship to property at the time owned by the Federal
Government. The synthesis of all the decisions on the point con-
sidered seems to be that implied immunity on a constitutional basis
still applies as against state taxes (1) which fall directly upon any
branch or agency of the Federal Government or (2) which are "on"
property owned by the Federal Government either in the hands of a
federal agency or in the hands of an independent contractor if the tax
is measured by the value of the federal property interest. 40 On the
other hand, there is no implied immunity from normal, nondiscrimina-
tory state taxation for those who have contracted with the Federal
Government to perform services for it even in connection with federal
property so long as the tax is not measured by the value of that prop-
erty. While one may question how much difference there is, in sub-
38. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495, 73 Sup. Ct. 800, 97 L. Ed.
741 (1953).
39. 345 U.S. at 500.
40. For instances in which state taxes upon third parties have been held valid
even though laid upon property in which the Federal Government had an
interest, see cases collected in 4 VAND. L. REv. 195 (1950). None of these in-
volved wholly owned property in the hands of a contractor performing services
for the United States.
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stance, between a tax on the storage of property by a third party which
must be borne by the owner (or a tax on the sale of property which
must be borne by one who becomes the owner) and a tax on the prop-
erty itself, this difference apparently amounts to a constitutional prin-
ciple. As Mr. Justice Reed's discussion in the Esso opinion of the
Tennessee Oil Company case shows, form rather than the essence of a
transaction becomes of major importance.
Obviously, certain aspects of the implied immunity question are
subject to control by draftmanship in the preparation of federal con-
tracts. More importantly, the problem can be taken out of the implied
immunity framework by congressional action. By statute, the implied
constitutional immunity of the federal agency may be taken away and
consent given to state and local taxation of the federal property; such
is the practical effect in the case of the "in lieu of" payments of the
Tennessee Valley Authority.41 Or Congress may, by statute, provide
immunity from state taxation for activities on behalf of the Federal
Government where none would be implied.42 Such a possibility arose
in another case recently decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
The question of the liability of cost-type contractors with the Atomic
Energy Commission for Tennessee sales and use taxes on materials
used in the performance of the contracts came up in 1951. The ma-
jority decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court43 which was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of the United States,44 was to the effect that
Section 9 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act,45 in providing immunity from
state taxation to the Commission and its "property, activities and in-
come," included such purchases and use by contractors under the term
"activities. '46 It was thus considered unnecesary to reach the implied
immunity question.
While it is true that uncertainties encountered in a situation such as
the Esso case can be remedied by specific statutory wording by Con-
gress, it is obvious that immunity provisions as vague as those in the
41. 48 STAT. 66 (1933), as amended, 54 STAT. 626 (1940), 16 U.S.C.A. § 8311
(1941). See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Polk County, 68 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Tenn. 1945). See also Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 18 L. Ed. 229 (U.S.
1865), and Roberts, J., dissenting in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S.
134, 161, 181, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155 (1937). Among statutory consents
to local taxation, see 38 STAT. 258 (1913), as amended, 40 STAT. 1314 (1919), 12
U.S.C.A. § 531 (1945) (federal reserve bank); 39 STAT. 380 (1916), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 931 (1945) (federal land bank); 48 STAT. 1252 (1934), as amended, 52 STAT.
22 (1938), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1714 (1945) (federal financed housing).
42. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495, 73 Sup. Ct. 800, 97
L. Ed. 741 (1953); Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232, 72 Sup. Ct.
257, 96 L. Ed. 257 (1952); Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21,
60 Sup. Ct. 15, 84 L. Ed. 11 (1939).
43. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. Carson, 192 Tenn. 150, 239 S.W.2d
27 (1951), 5 VAND. L. REV. 105.
44. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232, 72 Sup. Ct. 257, 96 L. Ed. 257
(1952), 22 TENN. L. REV. 437.
45. 60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1809(b) (1952).
46. See 32 B.U.L. REV. 241 (1952).
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Atomic Energy Act are not much help in putting the problem at rest.47
In another decision related to the immunity question, Penn-Dixie
Cement Corporation v. Kizer,48 Tennessee's Corporation Excise Tax
Law,49 as amended in 1951 to prohibit deduction of federal taxes in
computing net earnings subject to the excise, was attacked as void
because, inter alia, it was "subversive of the powers and repugnant to
the paramount authority of the United States." The Tennessee Su-
preme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Neil, rejected the argu-
ment that prohibiting the deduction of federal taxes was state tax
action upon a federal tax and thus a "burden" upon or an interference
with the Federal Government. No authority for or against the proposi-
tion was discussed in the opinion. Reference was made to the fact that
thirteen states have similar prohibitions against deducting federal
taxes. "If the Federal Government fails to intervene and protest
against this alleged unconstitutional invasion of its sovereignty the
appellant is not privileged to make the point to protect its own finan-
cial interest."50 It may be observed that, if, in fact, the tax violated
the principle of express or implied federal immunity, its invalidity
could be asserted by anyone from whom it was attempted to collect
the tax. Clearly, however, the tax here did not fall on any federal
agency or instrumentality or bear any relationship to federal property,
and there was no claim of specific congressional action to relieve from
the tax.
B. Retroactivity
The Penn-Dixie case also presented Constitutional issues regarding
the giving of retroactive effect to the 1951 amendment to the Corpora-
tion Excise Tax Law. Under the original statute, the tax was measured
by the corporation's net earnings for the preceding year and was made
"due and payable on July 1, 1923, and on July 1 of each succeeding
year." The 1951 amendment, which became effective on January 31,
1951, provided that "all taxes due on or'after July 1, 1951, shall be com-
puted in accordance herewith." The Penn-Dixie Corporation operated
on a fiscal year under which it had closed its books for 1950 prior to
the enactment of the above amendment. It objected to applying the
new method of computation to any 1950 earnings for purposes of the
payment due on July 1, 1951, and urged that, if the law compelled this,
it violated Article I, Section 20, of the Tennessee Constitution, for-
bidding laws retrospective or impairing contracts, and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
47. For questions as to the implications of the Roane-Anderson decision, see
Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HAMW. L. REV. 89, 136 (1952).
48. 250 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1952).
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1316 (Williams Supp. 1952).
50. 250 S.W.2d at 910.
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Chief Justice Neil's opinion first construed the statute (after ob-
serving some differences of opinion in the past) as exacting a payment
"for the privilege of doing business during the twelve months' period
ending June 30th next preceding the payment date of July 1st."5' Thus,
the tax to be collected should be measured by reference to the cor-
poration's net earnings during the year preceding that date. The con-
stitutional objections relating to retroactivity were found to be without
merit:
"Concluding that the Act is in a degree retroactive, or retrospective, this
does not in and of itself render it invalid, since in our opinion it does not
impair the obligation of a contract or operate to divest rights of any
vested interest. Taxing statutes are generally held to be constitutional
even though they have some retroactive effect [citing authorities]."52
In addition to finding the application of the 1951 amendment on a
retroactive basis to be consistent with due process, the opinion con-
cluded that the commissioner's construction of the tax in this instance
was not so "oppressive and arbitrary" as to violate that clause. The
Court's decision is in line with the weight of authority relating to re-
troactive taxation.53 Even if it be regarded as a general rule that "due
process" prohibits the levy of a tax (or a change in its rate) on a
privilege that has been completely exercised, that would be consistent
with the result in this case.
The problem of tax retroactivity arose in a more extreme form in
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Rhea County. 4 The 1949 tax levy of
Rhea County had exceeded the special (and general) purposes levy
permitted to the county by statute.55 By a private act,5 6 the legislature
in 1951 purported to validate each purpose and amount contained in
the 1949 levy. The Tennessee Supreme Court sustained the validity
of the curative statute, reasoning that there was power beforehand
to authorize levies for the purposes stated and that a taxpayer has no
vested right under a particular taxing statute.57 Again the result is
consistent with the general weight of authority, 8 although it might
51. Id. at 908.
52. Id. at 909.
53. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 59 Sup. Ct. 121, 83 L. Ed. 87 (1938); Milli-
ken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324, 75 L. Ed. 809 (1931); Garrett
Freight Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523, 146 A.L.R.
1003 (1943); see ROTTScHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 210-14, 683-85 (1939);
Note, 146 A.L.R. 1011 (1943).
54. 250 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. 1952).
55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1045.1 (Williams 1934).
56. Tenn. Private Acts 1951, c. 276.
57. See the Taxation subsection of the Counties section in the article on
Local Government Law appearing in this Survey for further discussion of this
decision.
58. Marion County v. L. & N.R.R., 91 Ky. 388, 15 S.W. 1061 (1891); see cases
collected in Note, 140 A.L.R. 959, 967-72, 993-96 (1942). Many of the states,
having a constitutional provision like that in Tennessee, have contrued the"retrospective" prohibition more rigidly. See Note, 140 A.L.R. 959, 972 (1942).
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appear that the literal wording of Article I, Section 20, would neces-
sarily condemn such a statute, since such levies, as this one originally
was, were considered "void" by the Court.
C. Miscellaneous
In Baumgartner v. South Pittsburg,9 the Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld for the second time6° the validity of a city ordinance providing
for parking meters. Such an ordinance, the opinion by Judge Prewitt
said, does not involve taxation without legislative authority. That the
fees so imposed are proper for the installation, regulation and mainte-
nance of these devices and do not amount to a tax is, of course, in line
with the great weight of opinion of courts throughout the country on
this subject.
61
In two cases, during the period considered, the Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld the power and propriety of courts to relieve taxpayers
of statutory penalties when the equities of the case seem to demand
it.62 If based on well-known principles of statutory construction call-
ing for a liberal construction in favor of a taxpayer and strict construc-
tion to avoid penalties, such cases raise no problems. If, apart from
statutory interpretation and the application of specific constitutional
provisions, the Court exercises power to relieve from statutory re-
quirements otherwise applicable because it is "sitting as a court of
equity," it would seem to raise serious questions relating to the basic
separation of governmntal functions called for under the Constitution
of the State.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN
In Maury County v. Porter,63 the Tennessee Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a statute64 relating to condemnation by counties of
certain properties for highway purposes. The act, in its entirety, was
found invalid by reason of the provisions of section 7, "particularly"
the part italicized:
. . . if the ... defendants are not satisfied with the amount assessed by
the condemner, they shall, on or before the second day of the regular
term of the court, next after the service of . . . notice, appear, except to
the amount assessed . . . and thereupon a trial may be had . . . but no
59. 256 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1953). See Note, Some Legal Questions Arising
out of the Use of Parking Meters, 6 VAND. L. REv. 907 (1953).
60. See Porter v. City of Paris, 184 Tenn. 555, 201 S.W.2d 688 (1947).
61. See Opinion of the Justices 94 N.H. 501, 51 A.2d 836 (1947); Grimes, The
Legality of Parking Meter Ordinances and Permissible Use of Parking Meter
Funds, 35 CALF. L. REV. 235 (1947); Note, 6 VAND. L. REV. 907 (1953).
62. Tennessee Products and Chemical Corp. v. Dickinson, 256 S.W.2d 709
(Tenn. 1953); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 250 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1952).
63. 257 S.W.2d 16 (Tenn. 1953).
64. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 178, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3291.5-3291.18 (Williams
Supp. 1952).
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trial shall be had until twelve months have expired after the completion
of said road, highway, freeway and/or parkway." (emphasis added) 65
The opinion of the Court, by Judge Burnett, found that the above
provision made "indefinite and indeterminable" the time when the con-
demnees might have their rights to compensation fixed in court. It
was pointed out that the completion of the project might be years af-
ter the property is "taken" and conceivably might never occur. The
Court did not invalidate the statute under Article I, Section 21, of the
Tennessee Constitution, requiring just compensation when property is
taken for a public use, but rather under the requirements of open
courts and no delay in administering justice contained in Article I,
Section 17. It was considered that the possible delay in being able to
secure a trial in court under this section was the same as a failure to
make adequate provisions for the certainty of payment of damages to
the landowner and for such payment without unreasonable delay.
66
Other sections of the act did provide for the condemner, acting for
the particular county, to assess the amount of damages incident to the
taking, to deposit the amount assessed with the clerk of the circuit
court and to file a petition with the court asking that the property be
condemned. Section 6 set forth the procedure leading up to and cul-
minating in the necessary court action where the property owners are
satisfied with the damages assessed by the condemner. Section 8
coverd instances where the owner fails to appear and except to the
assessment as required in section 7. The fact statement in the principal
case revealed nothing as to the adequacy of the damage assessment
filed by the representative of Maury County in this case or as to the
stage of completion of the project in question. The general doctrine
announced by the Court in this case is the usual one that when prop-
erty is taken, reasonable, certain and adequate provision must be made
for payment of damages without risk or unreasonable delay to the
owner.6 7 Adequate provision for compensation by the state or local
government within a reasonable time is an aspect of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 quite apart from state constitutional
65. TENN. CODE AwN. § 3291.11 (Williams Supp. 1952).
66. The Court cited with approval the case of McGibson v. Roane County
Court, 95 W. Va. 338, 121 S.E., 99 (1924), as the only available authority on
the point. The statute held unconstitutional in that case permitted entry on
land and the building of a road with no requirement that the county court
take any steps to ascertain compensation due the owners until 60 days after
the road was completed. A later decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court
upheld the validity of a statutory amendment under which final award or
judgment in condemnation proceedings was entered "after a reasonable time
has elapsed for completion of the work." Simms v. Dillon, 119 W. Va. 284, 193
S.E. 331, 113 A.L.R. 787 (1937). The West Virginia constitutional provision on
eminent domain (Article III, Section 9) is much more detailed in its require-
ments than is Article I, Section 21, of the Tennessee Constitution.
67. 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DoMAIN, §§ 8.3-8.4 (3d ed. 1950); 18 Am. Jur.,
Eminent Domain § 304 (1938).
68. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 40 Sup. Ct. 62, 64 L. Ed. 135 (1919). 1
NIcHoLs, EMINT DomAw § 4.8 (3d ed. 1950); ROTTSCHAEFER, CoNIsrnUTIOrAL
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requirements. The right of the property owner to be heard, in invitum,
within a reasonable time as to the adequacy of the compensation is
similarly a requirement of due process.69 It could well be concluded
that this statute, on its face, failed to accord this right. Instead of
these bases, the Court's opinion relied upon the provision about courts
being open, which is more questionable in light of the widespread use
of nonjudicial procedures in eminent domain proceedings.70
The Tennessee Supreme Court not only ruled section 7 to be un-
constitutional, it held the entire act invalid. The absence of a separa-
bility clause permitted the Court to invoke a presumption that the
legislature would not have enacted the statute except in its completed
form.71 This is consistent with a frequently cited decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States on the subject72 although as to that
Court an eminently qualified writer has concluded that "judicial de-
cisions on separability often reflect the attitude of the judges towards
the merits of the particular statute ... rather than an objective effort
to apply the principles which are always said to determine severa-
bility." 3 The basic principle is supposed to be that of determining
legislative intent, and the Tennessee Supreme Court's heavy reliance
on the absence of a separability clause in this instance was re-enforced
by its independent judgment as to whether the rest of the statute
would have been permitted to stand alone. As a matter of fact, it does
not appear that the parts of the statute which were left intact were
necessarily incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance
with a general legislative purpose to authorize counties to exercise the
power of eminent domain for the purposes listed. This would seem
to be particularly true in light of Code section 3133, which purports
to incorporate, for the future as well as the past, the provisions of
Code sections 3109-313274 in all legislative grants of condemnation
power "unless expressly stated the contrary. . . ."75 One might ques-
LAW 722 (1939). Due process does not require that the payment be in advance
of taking. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 16 Sup. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188 (1895).
Some state constitutions so require. See 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DomAN § 8.713
(3d ed. 1950); 18 Am. Ju., Eminent Domain § 305 (1938).
69. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 40 Sup. Ct. 62, 64 L. Ed. 135 (1919); Simms
v. Dillon, 119 W. Va. 284, 193 S.E. 331, 113 A.L.R. 787 (1937). See 1 NIcnors,
EMINENT DoIVmpIn § 4.103(4) (3d ed. 1950); ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 723 (1939).
70. See 1 NicHoLs, EMmNT DomAIN §§ 4.101-4.102 (3d ed. 1950). On the
matter of using commissions rather than juries in the federal courts under
Rule 71A, see 66 HARV. L. REv. 1314 (1953); 11 F.R.D. 212-44 (1952).
71. Citing Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCormack, 174 Tenn. 327, 125 S.W.2d 151
(1939).
72. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed. 287
(1929).
73. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51
HARV. L. R.v. 76, 114 (1937).
74. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3109-3132 (Williams 1934, Supp. 1952).
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 3133 (Williams 1934). See Tennessee Mining and
Mfg. Co. v. Anderson County, 173 Tenn. 497, 121 S.W.2d 543 (1938).
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tion why the 1951 statute was enacted in light of the eminent domain
powers already possessed by counties.76 If the answer is thought to be
the procedural advantages to the county of the unconstitutional section
7 in combination with section l1's offsetting of general as well as spe-
cial benefits in calculating damages,7 7 then the Court's refusal to let
the sections other than section 7 be operative alone- is consistent with
basic principles of separability.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
A. Separate Facilities on Basis of Race and Color
1. Schools: It has been said that the most important action taken
by the Supreme Court of the United States during the last term was
its failure to decide the five school segregation cases pending before
it and its setting of them for reargument on October 12, 1953J
8 Coun-
sel, including the Attorney-General of the United States, were re-
quested to address themselves in briefs and oral argument to several
rather detailed questions, of which the following will serve as
examples:
"1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the
State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not under-
stand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?
"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the
Fourteenth Amendment
"(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the
limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or
"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an
effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segre-
gated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?"
7 9
The ferment surrounding this general topic is reflected in the case
law applicable to Tennessee during the period under consideration.
Two decisions of federal district courts in the State were addressed to
76. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3159-3161 (Williams 1934).
77. The attack on this provision was not discussed by the Tennessee Supreme
Court; the usual rule permits offset of special benefits in assessing damages
but not of general benefits. See Knoxville v. Barton, 128 Tenn. 177, 159 S.W.
837 (1913); 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.6205 (3d ed. 1950). As to property
not taken, this is codified in TENN. CODE ANN. § 3122 (Williams Supp. 1952). See
Faulkner v. Nashville, 154 Tenn. 145, 285 S.W. 389 (1926).
78. 21 U.S.L. WEEK, 3321 (U.S. June 23, 1953). On the general subject, see
Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REV. 555
(1951). On segregation in interstate transportation, see 4 VA-D. L. REv. 689
(1951). See Note, 94 L. Ed. 1121 (1950);,
79. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 972, 73 Sup. Ct. 1114,
97 L. Ed. 956 (1953). For the facts of the cases, see Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F.
Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, af-
firming 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952).
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the question of segregation on the basis of race and color in the use of
certain public facilities. In McSwain v. County Board of Education of
Anderson County,80 Judge Robert L. Taylor held that Negro high
school students and their parents, residing in Clinton, Tennessee, were
not deprived of their constitutional rights by the students being
obliged to attend a Negro high school in Knoxville while white stu-
dents "similarly situated" attended Clinton High School. An appeal
in the case has been argued before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, but decision apparently has been held up to
await the United States Supreme Court's decision in the five cases
mentioned above.
Although it was denied by the plaintiffs in the McSwain case that
the suit attacked segregation, the Court considered it as necessarily
having that effect. The relief prayed for, a declaratory judgment and
an injunction, was denied, and the action was dismissed. The court
found that the plaintiffs were not really aggrieved and that the ar-
rangement for attending school in another county was a reasonable
method by which responsible governmental agencies carried out the
obligation of the State of Tennessee to provide equal educational fa-
cilities. The school in another county to which the plaintiff students
were sent by bus, in fact, carried a slightly higher rating than the Clin-
ton High School attended by white students.81 The Court observed
that transportation of students across county lines is common through-
out the State and that many white high school students in Anderson
County are so transported even if those in Clinton are not.
Judge Taylor pointed out that separation of white and colored races
in schools is required by the Constitution 82 and statutes8 3 of Tennessee.
The segregation which results, he said, is not discriminatory, since it
treats all races alike, and substantial equality, even though accorded
on a separate basis, has been held to satisfy the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Plessy v. Ferguson84 and other precedents.
The court distinguished the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,85 which held that the equal
80. 104 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Tenn. 1952).
81. The Negro students from Clinton had first been sent to a high school
in Campbell County, rated "C." Subsequent to their request for admission to
the "A" rated Clinton High School and the refusal, arrangements for at-
tendance at the "A-i" Negro high school in Knoxville were made. See 104
F. Supp. at 863.
82. TENN. CoNsT. Art. X, § 12.
83. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11395-11397 (Williams 1934).
84. 163 U.S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
85. 305 U.S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed. 208 (1938). In McCready v. Byrd,
195 Md. 131, 73 A.2d 8, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950), the Supreme Court of
Maryland considered this case controlling when it issued a mandamus to
compel the admission of the plaintiff Negro as a first year student in the School
of Nursing of the University of Maryland. Pursuant to the Southern Regional
Education Compact (see Note, 1 VAND. L. REv. 403 (1948)), the plaintiff had
been offered and had declined a course in the Meharry Medical College, School
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protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not satisfied by
Missouri providing legal education for Negroes in other states while
making it available within the geographic limits of the state to whites.
It was considered that there is no similar obligation in terms of the
geographic limits of Anderson County and that Tennessee, in the in-
stant case, was according substantially equivalent facilities to the
plaintiffs within the State. The riding of a bus back and forth to Knox-
ville by plaintiff students was a "small contribution" toward making
the system of "separate but equal" facilities work. The alternative, as
the Judge saw it, is a duplication of school facilities at every level of
education involving "similarly situated" Negro and white students,
which "would break the back of public education in Tennessee."
The forthcoming decisions of the United States Supreme Court will
shed light on the present validity of the "separate but equal" doctrine
as applied to public grade and high schools. It may be observed, how-
ever, that, even if this doctrine is reaffirmed, there will remain a ques-
tion under a situation such as that in the McSwain case as to a lack
of equality in fact in the facilities furnished.86 Certain older decisions,
usually speaking only of requiring "substantial equality," employed a
standard which at times permitted actual inferiorities and disadvan-
tages.87 In the realm of graduate and professional education, however,
the United States Supreme Court in recent years has insisted upon the
reality of equal facilities, taking into consideration the intangibles af-
fecting the particular line of study as well as the more concrete aspects
of the facilities provided. 88 This has resulted in its being held, for
example, that one of the oldest and best-equipped of the separate state
law schools for Negroes did not provide equal facilities.89 This same
insistence upon equality in fact has been extended into lower educa-
of Nursing, at Nashville. The Court found that "in educational facilities and
living conditions the nursing school at Meharry College is not only equal but
superior to the University of Maryland nursing school," but "[o]bviously no
compact or contract can extend the territorial boundaries or the sovereignty
of the State of Maryland to Nashville." 73 A.2d at 9.
86. Carter v. School Board of Arlington County, Virginia, 182 F.2d 531 (4th
Cir. 1950); Corbin v. County School Board of Pulaski County, Virginia, 177
F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949); cf. United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1882); Williams v. Board of Education of City of Parsons, 79 Kan. 202,
99 Pac. 216 (1908).
87. Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912); Wright v. Board
of Education of City of Topeka, 129 Kan. 852, 284 Pac. 363 (1930); Lehew v.
Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W. 765 (1891); State ex rel. Gumm v. Albritton,
98 Okla. 158, 224 Pac. 511 (1923); Martin v. Board of Education, 42 W. Va.
514, 26 S.E. 348, (1896); cf. Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education,
175 U.S. 528, 20 Sup. Ct. 197, 44 L. Ed. 262 (1899) ; see Note, [1950] WASH. U.L.Q.
594, 598-601.
88. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 Sup. Ct. 851, 94
L. Ed. 1149 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 Sup. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed.
1114 (1950).
89. McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
951 (1951), 30 N.C.L. REv. 153 (1952); see Taylor, The Demise of Race Distinc-
tions in Graduate Education, 1 Du KE B.J. 135, 142-44 (1951).
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tional levels by some courts.90 It is obvious that, if equality in fact,
applied to the intangibles as well as the tangibles of education, is
pushed far enough, it will make it impossible for separate facilities
to meet the constitutional standard, quite apart from the financial
difficulties which may be involved.91 Thus, the collateral attack will
have won a victory over enforced segregation, as it already has at the
graduate and professional level. It has been suggested, however, by
Circuit Chief Judge Parker in his opinion in one of the cases now pend-
ing before the United States Supreme Court that there are significant
differences between the considerations applicable at the graduate and
professional education level and those applicable at the common school
level.92
2. Public Recreational Facilities: The other decision in Tennessee
touching on the segregation question was that of Judge Robert N. Wil-
kin (retired), sitting by special assignment in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, in Hayes v. Crutcher.
93
This was a class action by Negro citizens of Nashville against the
Board of Park Commissioners for a declaration of rights and an injunc-
tion restraining (a) failure to furnish Negro citizens equal privileges
on city golf courses and (b) the making of distinctions on the basis of
color or race in providing public golf course facilities. An answer was
filed denying (a) that plaintiffs were representatives of the class
claimed and (b) that an actual controversy existed and alleging (a)
that the golf courses were supported by green fees charged players and
(b) that defendants were engaged in planning separate and equal golf-
ing facilities for Negroes which would be constructed in the reasonable
future. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment on the
pleadings, and Judge Wilkin's opinion was written to accompany his
denial of this motion.
90. See cases cited in note 82 supra and Davis v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County, Virginia, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Pitts v.
Board of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949); State ex rel. Brewton V.
Board of Education, 361 Mo. 86, 233 S.W.2d 697 (1950). But cf. Brown v. Ram-
sey, 185 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1950); Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
91. Many writers have urged that equality in fact is impossible of accom-
plishment with segregated facilities -i.e., that such facilities necessarily in-
volve inequality. See dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Edgerton in Carr v.
Coming, 182 F.2d 14, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1950), particularly the quotation from
2 REPORT OF THE PREsIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION 31, 35 (1947)
appearing in his note 90, 182 F.2d at 32. See also The Effects of Segregation and
the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L.
REV. 427, 439 (1953) (excerpt from Appendix to Appellants Briefs filed in the
School Segregation Cases, note 75 supra); cf. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
629 (1944); Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L.
R.v. 555, 561 (1951).
92. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 535. (E.D.S.C. 1951). For historical
and political analyses of the problem, see Frank and Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COL. L. REV. 131 (1950);
Roche, Education, Segregation and the Supreme Court-A Political Analysis,
99 U. OF PA. L. REV. 949 (1951).
93. 108 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Tenn. 1952).
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The denial of the motion as to the prayer relating to equal privileges
was based on a conclusion that there existed dispute as to material
facts concerning such matters as the representative status of plaintiffs,
the reality of a demand for such facilities and the status of defendants'
plans for a separate Negro golf course. Judge Wilkin pointed out that,
while a reasonable period for preparation will be permitted, the Con-
stitution requires that equality in public golfing facilities be afforded
Negro citizens. His dictum in this regard is supported by a number of
recent decisions throughout the country.94 In refusing summary judg-
ment as to the prayer relating to "making distinctions" on a race or
color basis in providing public golf facilities, Judge Wilkin's opinion
adhered strongly to the idea that segregation is not forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment: "Plessy v. Ferguson... is still the law of the
land.",95
The opinion discussed segregation and general problems of racial
relationships at considerable length. There was no reference of any
sort to any of the numerous studies, reports and treatises examining
with differing viewpoints the ethical, sociological, political, economic,
biological and psychological aspects of this question.96 Judge Wilkin
stated that segregation is not only recognized in constitutional law,
it is supported by the natural law of like associating with like. The
law, he said, must recognize and be adapted to such natural and in-
stinctive principles, since it is futile for it to do otherwise. While the
law protects the basic legal rights of all, regardless of color, and is
therefore set against oppression and exploitation, it does not intrude
into private and social affairs - "Racial differences do not in any way
... justify arrogance, pride, intolerance, or abuse. ' 97 All races need
to learn this, he stated, and through the agencies of education, philoso-
phy and religion members of all races and colors should regard them-
selves as "partners, mutually responsible for one another under God."' '
The law, however, should attempt to do only what it can do effectively;
certain recent developments burden democratic and legal processes
with obligations which they are unable to meet, thus destroying the del-
icate balance of our society and playing into hands of revolutionaries.
Only time will tell whether the attitude of this opinion or its anti-
94. Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951); Law v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346 (D. Md. 1948); cf. Rice v. Arnold, 45
So.2d 195 (Fla.), rev'd per curiam, 340 U.S. 848 (1950), reconsidered, 54 So.2d
114 (Fla. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952). On public swimming pools,
see Draper v. St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950); Lopez v. Seccombe,
71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Calif. 1944); cf. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004
(S.D. W. Va. 1948) (municipal pool leased to private persons). See Hyman,
Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REV. 555, 563 (1951).
95. 108 F. Supp. at 584.
96. The most comprehensive is MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DIEMMA (1944).
97. 108 F. Supp. at 585.
98. Ibid.
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thesis is more apt to bring on the adverse effects mentioned. It seems
highly unlikely that any legal pronouncement in 1952 or 1953 will be
more than a way station in the development of law in this field.99
99. As this is written, the Nashville newspapers carry stories of a projected
new park for Negroes (including a golf course). Local Negro leaders are in
disagreement as to the enthusiasm with which they should accept these segre-
gated facilities.
